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CMPB Friends. Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 122 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 914 (2002).
LAW: Liquor licensees bear an affirmative duty to ensure that
minors are not permitted to enter and remain on their premises.
FACTS: Royal Room is a bar, which is licensed and serves
alcoholic beverages. On June 15, 2000, Celeste Jimenez, a
twenty-year old woman entered the Royal Room with friends and
sat at a table. At the time, there were forty to sixty patrons at the
bar and only one waitress. After ten minutes the waitress came to
Ms. Jimenez's table and asked to see age identification.
According to the waitress' assertions, Ms. Jimenez presented the
waitress with the identification of Melissa Guzman, a person
almost eight years older than her and thirty pounds heavier. Ms.
Jimenez explained that she had recently lost weight, and the
waitress accepted the identification and asked for her drink order.
Ms. Jimenez began drinking beer from a pitcher at a nearby table.
Approximately thirty minutes later two department investigators
appeared, approached Ms. Jimenez, and asked her to step outside.
They asked her age and she replied that she was twenty years old.
The investigators found her real identification as well as the fake
identification card she had used. The investigators cited Ms.
Jimenez as a minor and filed an accusation against Royal Room
for violating § 25665, which prohibits a licensee from permitting
a minor to enter and remain on its premises without lawful
business. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board
suspended the establishment's license for ten days. On appeal,
the instant court reversed and remanded.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that there is no set time period
in which a violation occurs. According to the court, ten minutes
does not necessarily constitute an unreasonable amount of time
within which to demand proof of age. Such a determination is
question of fact to be decided in each case. The court found that
this case is therefore different than the Ballesteros v. Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 234 Cal. App. 2d 694, because
the ten minute increment is not the deciding factor. Rather, the
deciding factor is whether or not the minor was permitted to stay
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on the premises. In the instant case the minor was asked her age
within ten minutes but presented fake identification.
HOLDING: Reversed and remanded. Department's finding that
a ten minute period of time passed before petitioner checked the
identification of the minor, without more, does not compel the
conclusion that the petitioner violated § 25665.
IMPACT: The instant court made an analytical decision.
Although the standard of review requires that the court may not
exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, and must
accept findings of fact made by the Department as conclusive,
this court pushes the threshold somewhat, by rendering a decision
based on different analytical standards.
Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd., 940 Cal. App. 4th 880 (2002).
LAW: The Court of Appeal will not presume that state-
employed professional ALJ's cannot or do not bring a
constitutional level of impartiality to the cases they hear, even if
one side is the agency that directly employs them.
FACTS: The real party in interest, Renee Vicary ("Vicary"), is
the proprietor of Angels Sports Bar, a topless entertainment
establishment. The bar is licensed to serve alcoholic beverages.
The California Code of Regulations, (Title IV, § 143.3) prohibits
the exposure of breast or buttock unless the dancer is on a raised
stage at least six feet from patrons. During a supervising
investigation of the establishment by the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control ("Department"), the investigators
found that the Code was violated seven times. The
Administrative Law Judge ("AL") sustained all counts of the
accusation and a license suspension of thirty days was imposed.
Vicary appealed, and the case was heard by the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Appeals Board ("Board"). The Board reversed
the decision of the ALJ on the basis that the rule could not
constitutionally be applied to the arguably "expressive" conduct
of the dancers. The Department sought judicial review from the
instant court.
23-1
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that pursuant to legislative
history, the ALJ can be appointed or equivalently hired by the
director. It has been consistently recognized that the fact that the
agency or entity holding the hearing also pays the adjudicator
does not automatically require disqualification. The court
reasoned that there was no suspicion of bias in this case.
Substantively, the court reasoned that the Board erred in
understanding the state's power to impose regulations directed at
the undesirable secondary effects of certain types of
entertainment and the establishments offering them. The state,
through the department, has not prohibited dancers from
performing with erotic expression. They are simply forbidden to
do so in establishments that serve alcohol, and the constitution is
not thereby offended.
HOLDING: The court of appeal held that 1) the statute allowing
the Department to hire and use its own AL's appointed by the
director sufficiently authorized the Department to hire and use its
own AL' s and did not deprive proprietor of due process, and 2)
the regulation did not unconstitutionally limit expressive conduct
of the entertainers. Pursuant to the writ of review, the decision of
the Board was annulled and remanded.
IMPACT: This allows great deference for the administrative
law system. However, it is possible that there may be
subconscious bias that may be overlooked.
COLORADO STATE COURT
Morgan v. Colorado Dep't of Health Care Policy and Fin., 56
P.3d 1136 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
LAW: An administrative agency's determination may be
reversed only if the court finds the agency acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner, made a determination that is unsupported
by the evidence in the record, erroneously interpreted the law, or
exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority.
FACTS: Plaintiff, Morgan, applied for Home and Community
Based Services for the Elderly, Blind, and Disabled ("HCBS") in
1998. To be eligible for these benefits the applicant must have a
functional impairment sufficiently severe to require the "level of
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care" available in a nursing home. "Level of care"
determinations are made by the Colorado Foundation for Medical
Care, a peer review organization ("PRO") operating under
contract with the state. First, the PRO case manager makes an
initial assessment. Second, a program coordinator scores the
applicant using a point system. Under the system, a point score
of twenty or more automatically qualifies the applicant for
benefits. Otherwise, the application is referred to a physician
advisor for review. Plaintiff originally received a point score of
thirteen. Accordingly, the physician advisor determined her
ineligible. Several reconsiderations were granted, all of which
determined her ineligible. The case was referred to an
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who also determined her
ineligible. Then, a final agency review once again affirmed.
Plaintiff filed an action in the district court, which affirmed the
decision, and an appeal was filed with the instant court, which
also affirmed.
ANALYSIS: After reviewing the evidence, the court found that
the agency rendered decision was not pursuant to any arbitrary or
capricious actions, was supported by evidence in the record, and
the law was not erroneously interpreted or excessive of
constitutional or statutory authority.
HOLDING: The instant court affirmed the decision holding that
1) the department properly evaluated claimant when determining
her ineligibility; 2) the use of unpublished criteria to evaluate
claimant did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, the
delegation doctrine, or due process; and 3) claimant's eligibility
was properly determined by a physician, even though the HCBS
physician advisor did not personally examine the claimant.
IMPACT: This case sets a stringent policy on eligibility for
health care benefits. The trend pursuant to this case would be to
provide great deference to the department as opposed to the
individuals who bring a claim.
.23-1
INDIANA STATE COURT
Worman Enter.. Inc. v. Boone County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist.,
779 N.E.2d 565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
LAW: The receipt of ex parte evidence by an administrative
authority may be prejudicial error if the following three-prong
test is answered in the affirmative: 1) did the administrative
authority exercise a function of an adjudicatory nature; 2) did the
administrative authority fail to make known and available the ex
parte evidence to the affected party and allow that party the
opportunity to rebut the evidence; 3) did the administrative
authority base its findings or decision on that ex parte evidence.
FACTS: The plaintiff, Worman Enterprises, Inc. ("Worman"),
has operated a long term clean fill processing and organic
recycling facility in Boone County since 1984. On September 9,
1998, the defendant, Boone County Solid Waste Management
District ("District"), adopted resolution 98-3 which set forth
certain requirements for permitting and operation a solid waste
facility and clean fill site. The District brought suit against
Worman, alleging that Worman is operating an unpermitted clean
fill site over which the district has permitting authority. On
October 8, 1998, the parties filed a settlement agreement wherein
the District agreed to dismiss the lawsuit and Worman agreed to
file for a permit. However, a condition stated that if the permit
was not issued to Worman, or issued with unacceptable
conditions, the agreement would have no effect. On July 28,
1999, Worman submitted an application for a permit. In October
2000, the permit was issued; however, on November 13, 2000,
Worman filed a verified complaint for a declaratory judgment
alleging that certain terms contained in the permit were
unlawfully imposed and the District did not have the authority to
issue the permit. The trial court granted a summary judgment
motion, dismissing the complaint, and Worman appealed. The
instant court reversed and remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the Indiana Home Rule
Act specifically dictates that a local governmental unit does not
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have the power to regulate conduct that is regulated by a state
agency, except as expressly granted by statute. However, the
District does not fall under the strict definition of a unit; therefore
the Home Rule Act is inapplicable. The District falls under the
municipal corporation definition, which follows the traditional
rule, which is limited to the powers expressly granted by the
General Assembly. Therefore, the District would have the power
to adopt a permit system if it was necessary for the reduction,
management, and disposal of waste.
HOLDING: The court found as a matter of law that the District
does have the authority to issue permits like the one it issued to
Worman Enterprises. However, there was an issue of material
fact as to whether the receipt of ex parte evidence during the
permit application process was prejudicial error. Therefore, the
court reversed and remanded to determine whether the receipt of
ex parte communications during the application process resulted
in the prejudicial error, as well as to consider Worman's
challenges to permit provisions.
IMPACT: The court created a bright line test, which is efficient
in ex parte evidence cases.
NEW JERSEY STATE COURT
Lindquist v. Jersey City Fire Dep't, 814 A.2d 1069 (N.J. 2003).
LAW: Courts generally give substantial deference to
administrative determinations. In workers' compensation cases,
the scope of appellate review is limited to whether the findings
made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient, credible
evidence present in the record, considering the proofs as a whole,
with due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the
witnesses to judge of their credibility. Deference is given unless
the factual findings and legal determinations made by the Judge
of Compensation are manifestly unsupported by, or inconsistent
with, competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to
offend the interest of justice.
FACTS: Plaintiff, Lindquist, has been a firefighter for over
twenty-three years, from 1972 until January 1995. He retired in
1995, mainly due to a buy out for health considerations. He
suffered from heart palpitations, shortness of breath, and
weakness. Although through the course of his employment he
was provided a mask to limit his exposure to harmful fumes, he
claimed he was still exposed to the fumes when he had to take the
mask off for orders, to clean out the mask, or when condensation
developed in the mask. After serious exposure to fires, he claims
that his employment caused or contributed to his development of
pulmonary emphysema within the meaning of the occupational
disease provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. The case
was heard by the Judge of Compensation, who concluded that
Lindquist's condition was due, in material degree, to occupational
exposure to toxic smoke. The judge awarded Lindquist disability
of thirty percent for emphysema. However, the appellate division
reversed. The instant court reversed and reinstated the original
opinion.
ANALYSIS: In workers' compensation cases, scientific theory
of causation that has not yet reached general acceptance maybe
found to be sufficiently reliable if it is based on sound,
adequately founded scientific methodology, involving data and
information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the
scientific field. In New Jersey, it is sufficient to prove that the
exposure to risk or danger in the workplace was in fact a
contributing cause of the injury.
HOLDING: Appellate division decision was reversed.
Judgment of Division of Workers' Compensation was reinstated.
IMPACT: This leaves Plaintiffs with the possibility of winning
their case without direct proof of injury. This case relaxes the
stringent evidentiary requirements of the past.
NORTH CAROLINA STATE COURT
Jordan v. Civil Serv. Bd., 570 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
LAW: A court of appeals role in reviewing a lower (superior)
court's review of an administrative board's decision is to
determine whether the trial court exercised the proper scope of
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review and to decide whether the trial court correctly applied this
scope of review.
FACTS: Plaintiff Shannon Jordan, a former police officer,
opened fire on a driver who failed to stop at a police checkpoint,
fatally wounding the driver. Due to this behavior and violation of
departmental rules and procedures governing the use of deadly
force, Defendant Civil Service Board terminated Jordan's
employment. Jordan appealed the decision by the Board to the
superior court, which affirmed its order. Jordan then appealed
the trial court's decision to the court of appeals.
ANALYSIS: First, the court looked at whether the trial court
used the proper scope of review. Plaintiff, in his brief to the trial
court, presented legal arguments premised upon errors of law
committed by the board, which required the trial court to conduct
a de novo review of the decision. The court concluded that the
trial court did in fact use a de novo standard of review.
Next, the court examined whether the trial court applied
the standard properly. The court found that, under the
circumstances, the trial court properly came to its own
conclusions of law and fact in finding that Plaintiff Jordan used
excessive force in firing upon the driver at the checkpoint.
Further, the court found no evidence that the trial court erred in
finding that Jordan used unreasonable force and was properly
terminated for doing so.
Finally, the court addressed Plaintiff's final argument
that he was denied his right to an impartial hearing because the
Chairperson of the Board was simultaneously employed as an
investigator and as the victim's lawyer. The court found that
there was no evidence of bias or impartiality and the Board acted
properly in allowing such a situation.
HOLDING: The court held that: (1) the proper standard of
review was applied, (2) the standard of review was applied
properly in this situation, and (3) there was no evidence of due
process of equal protection violations. The decision was
affirmed.
IMPACT: It seems that the de novo standard used by both the
trial court and the court of appeals is dependant on whether the
petitioner argues for it. Because of this, the court may be
usurping some authority from administrative agencies since the
de novo standard gives the reviewing court wide latitude in
reviewing decisions.
Kea v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 570 S.E.2d 919 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002).
LAW: A court of appeals role in reviewing a lower (superior)
court's review of an administrative board's decision is to
determine whether the trial court exercised the proper scope of
review and to review whether the trial court correctly applied this
scope of review.
FACTS: Petitioner Kea was terminated from his employment at
the O'Berry Center, a State facility for the mentally retarded, for
unacceptable personal conduct involving a female subordinate
employee, Veronica Ham. Kea was found to have: (1) treated
Ham in a special and preferential way when he supervised her by
giving her better hours and other special treatment, (2) sexually
harassing Ham by repeatedly asking her to lunch and dinner and
making sexual advances, and (3) by retaliating against Ham when
she refused his advances by transferring her to another
department. Also, Petitioner was found to have disobeyed a
direct order by discussing the fact that he was being investigated
on these charges with other employees. Petitioner's termination
was reviewed by an AU, who found that, based on the findings,
Respondent had just cause in terminating Petitioner. The State
Personnel Commission adopted the AL's decision. Petitioner
appealed this decision to the State Superior Court, which reversed
the Commission's decision based on its finding that Petitioner
was not afforded his constitutionally guaranteed due process due
to lack of notice and oral and written warnings. The Respondent
appealed to the court of appeals.
ANALYSIS: Respondent's first argument was that the Superior
Court applied the wrong standard of review, which in this case
was de novo. The court disagreed, stating that when Petitioner
appealed to the Superior Court he alleged that the record did not
support several of the Commission's conclusions of law. The
court determined that these types of arguments are subject to de
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novo review. Accordingly, the court found that the superior court
applied the correct standard of review but did not agree with the
superior court's findings that Petitioner was denied due process
of law. The record showed that Petitioner was not entitled to oral
or written warnings because he violated known and written work
rules. Further, the court found that Petitioner was given
sufficient notice, based on the record.
Finally, the court found that Petitioner's argument-that
he was deprived of an impartial and unbiased decision maker-
lacked merit. There was no evidence that Frank Ferrell, the man
assigned as both investigator and adjudicator, had any
disqualifying personal bias that affected his decision-making
ability.
HOLDING: The court found that although the trial court used
the proper standard of review, there was substantial evidence to
support the Commission's ruling that Petitioner's due process
rights were not violated. The trial court's decision was reversed,
thereby reinstating the Commission's order.
IMPACT: As stated in Jordan, above, this holding shows that
de novo review gives the reviewing court great liberty in
scrutinizing the trial court's decision.
PENNSYLVANIA STATE COURT
Bucks County Children & Youth Soc. Servs. Agency v. Dep't of
Pub. Welfare, 808 A.2d 990 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
LAW: In cases of alleged child abuse, the Children and Youth
Services ("CYS") Agency has the burden of establishing by
substantial evidence that a report of child abuse is accurate. In
cases where the decision of the CYS is appealed, the attorney
examiner assigned is the ultimate finder of fact.
FACTS: Petitioner CYS appeals an order from the Department
of Public Welfare ("the Department") to expunge the name of a
suspected child molester, R.J., from the ChildLine Registry, a
service that lists the names of child molesters. A nineteen-year-
old female, M.K.B., brought the original action and alleged that
R.J., her softball coach for a number of years, had sexually
abused her over a five-year period. CYS found for M.K.B., and
R.J. appealed the decision, which was then heard by an attorney
examiner. The attorney examiner heard testimony from both
M.K.B. and the CYS caseworker assigned to the file, who merely
reiterated the testimony she received from M.K.B. There was no
other substantial evidence to corroborate M.K.B.'s accusations.
The attorney examiner determined that CYS had not met its
burden and ordered R.J.'s name to be expunged from the
ChildLine Registry. CYS appealed the decision.
ANALYSIS: According to the governing law, the court found
that CYS significantly failed to meet the burden of proof in its
case against R.J. Not only was there no evidence to corroborate
M.K.B.'s accusations against R.J., but the details from M.K.B.
about the incidents were sketchy and vague. The details came in
the form of flashbacks when M.K.B. underwent memory therapy
due to an unrelated car accident, thus lending even more to their
unreliability.
HOLDING: The court found in favor of the Department and
ordered the removal of R.J.'s name from the registry.
IMPACT: Although the facts in this case seem to indicate that
CYS fell far below the proper burden of proof in child abuse
cases, there is a danger that the burden is too high in the first
place. Many times in cases like these, there is only going to be
one witness, the victim, and future victims may have their rights
limited due to the precedent set in this case.
Cardiac Sci., Inc. v. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 808 A.2d 1029 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002).
LAW: Courts will not review the action of governmental bodies
of administrative tribunals involving acts of discretion without a
showing of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power.
FACTS: Petitioner Cardiac Science, Inc. ("Cardiac Science")
petitioned for a review of the decision by the Department of
General Services ("DGS") which denied challenging Cardiac
Science's bid protest of DGS's award of a contract for the
purchase of a shipment of automatic external defibrillators to
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another bidder. The problem arose when Cardiac Science
included a term in their bid proposal a term stating that delivery
shall be F.O.B. place of shipment, which places the risk of
shipment on the seller until the shipment is in possession of the
carrier. DGS required the bids to include F.O.B. destination,
which places the risk on the seller until the shipment reached its
destination. DGS alerted Cardiac Science of the mistake, to
which Cardiac responded by sending a new backdated bid that
had the correct terms. However, DGS rejected Cardiac Science's
bid as being non-responsive and awarded the bid to the next
lowest bidder.
Cardiac Science filed a bid protest to the Deputy
Secretary of DGS. Cardiac Science did not request a hearing, but
instead included its legal arguments in a letter, stating that the
accidental inclusion of the wrong shipment term was not material
and was not grounds for the bid to be dismissed as non-
responsive. The Deputy Secretary determined that Cardiac
Science's bid protest lacked merit and refused to reverse the
award of the contract to the other bidder. Cardiac Science
appealed this decision to the commonwealth court, arguing that
the misplaced shipping term should be disregarded because it was
not intended to be part of the bid package and that the bid was
otherwise complete. Further, Cardiac Science argued that their
representative, who was contacted by DGS, informed DGS of the
mistake and resubmitted a corrected bid, thereby curing the
mistake. Finally, Cardiac Science argued that the inclusion of the
incorrect term was nonmaterial and should have been considered
a waiveable technical defect.
ANALYSIS: The court quoted the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Procurement Code, which stated that the contract in question
should be awarded to the person who submitted a bid that
conforms in all material respects to the invitation for bids. It is
up to DGS, the court states, to determine whether the bid in
question does in fact conform to the invitation for bids. Here, the
court shows that DGS made very clear the type of shipment term
that was to be included in the bid, and that Cardiac Science
clearly included a term contrary to the correct one. Further, the
court argues that the inclusion of the wrong term was not as
immaterial as Cardiac Science suggested, but in any case, the
decision on materiality is left to the discretion of DGS. Cardiac
Science offered other legal arguments claiming its right to due
process was violated because it was not offered a hearing, but the
court dismissed them since Cardiac Science did not request a
hearing. Without any evidence of abuse of discretion, the court
must affirm the decision.
HOLDING: The court affirmed the decision by DGS, since it
found no evidence of abuse of discretion, fraud, bad faith, or
abuse of power.
IMPACT: This decision tends to give the administrative body,
in this case the Department of General Services, wide latitude in
discretionary decisions. One can argue that such a seemingly
simple mistake, like a wrong phrase placed in a bid offered, can
have dire effects that are not proportional to the mistake.
UTAH STATE COURT
Speirs v. S. Utah Univ., 60 P.3d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
LAW: Even when a medical panel is convened, the
Administrative Law Judge ("AL")/ Labor Commission is always
the ultimate finder of fact.
FACTS: Petitioner Linda Speirs sustained injury to her nose,
right ankle and left knee while waitressing on the Southern Utah
University campus. Initially, she received workers'
compensation benefits, but her employer later denied those
benefits. Petitioner appealed to the Utah Labor Commission,
asking for permanent partial disability benefits and future
medical costs. The ALJ assigned to the case convened a medical
panel to render a medical opinion, based on the fact that there
were conflicting medical opinions as to the extent of Petitioner's
injuries thus far. The panel conducted an independent medical
exam of Petitioner and offered their medical opinion that
Petitioner suffered a four percent permanent physical impairment
due to her injuries and should be awarded accordingly.
The ALJ found, based on the opinion given by the
medical panel and other evidence in the record, that Petitioner
suffered no permanent partial impairment from her injuries
except the four percent whole body impairment attributable to her
Spring 2003 Legal Summaries
266 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 23-1
ankle injury, and awarded Petitioner $915.16 in disability
compensation. Petitioner appealed to the Commission, based on
the argument that the, medical panel had usurped the AL's
authority and that the medical panel was biased. The
Commission affirmed and Petitioner appealed to the State Court
of Appeals.
ANALYSIS: Petitioner argued that the medical panel usurped
the authority of the ALJ and the Commission by rendering a
medical opinion which was used in the AL's findings. The court
stated that the Commission has discretion to determine the facts
and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before it.
Further, the Commission's decision shall be upheld unless the
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality. The court stated that in order to award compensation,
the Commission must make findings of fact and draw conclusions
of law. In difficult cases, the opinions of a medical panel may be
of assistance in determining whether to award compensation
based on the panel's medical expertise. In rendering an opinion,
the panel should be allowed to perform tests and examinations
that it deems necessary and desirable to render its opinion. The
court noted that while assistance from a medical panel is
appropriate, the ALJ/Commiission is always the ultimate fact
finder. Here, the ALJ reviewed not only the panel's opinion, but
also the earlier conflicting reports before making his
determination on compensation. The court stated that it is clear
from the record that the AU examined the record as a whole
before making a determination and the AL's findings were
reasonable based on the evidence.
HOLDING: While an AU may not abdicate his responsibility
entirely to a medical panel, he may seek assistance from one and
rely on its medical opinion in rendering a decision.
IMPACT: This case may be walking the fine line that is drawn
between using a medical opinion in a determination and
delegating decision making authority entirely to a nonjudicial
party. The danger lies in the varying medical opinions that can
be offered to reach a final decision, and it is up to the courts to
keep the boundaries firm.
